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The optimal management of research portfolios
Peter Bardsley*
Risky research projects are, other things being equal, intrinsically harder to
monitor than projects that are less risky. It is shown using agency theory that a
standard cost bene¢t analysis, which ignores the agency problem, will introduce a
bias towards excessively risky projects, and it will under-estimate the bene¢ts from
complementary investments in libraries, scienti¢c equipment and other expend-
itures that increase the productivity of scientists. Research managers should be
risk-averse in their choice of projects, and they should aim to hold a balanced
portfolio of projects. The nature of this portfolio problem is, however, quite
di¡erent from the portfolio management problem in ¢nancial markets.
1. Introduction
How should a public research institute choose its portfolio of projects?
Should it diversify its investment in some risk-averse manner, or should it
evaluate the expected value of each potential project in isolation,
1 accepting
those for which the expected bene¢ts exceed the expected costs and rejecting
the others?
The focus of this article is on applied scienti¢c research in agriculture
carried out in large publicly funded institutions, though the conclusions are
not restricted to this sector. There is a long tradition of publicly provided
research in agriculture because of the structure of agriculture and the nature
of the technology. Some research outputs can be captured in a proprietary
way (chemicals, seeds) but many cannot. Alston, Pardey and Smith (1996)
estimate that worldwide public research expenditure in agriculture exceeds
US$9 billion per year, and that it has been increasing at 5 per cent per year.
This research is undertaken in a number of institutional settings: govern-
ment departments of agriculture, universities, national scienti¢c institutes;
and international scienti¢c institutes, in particular those of the Consultative
Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). Support for
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1There are straightforward cost and bene¢t based reasons for not considering projects in
isolation if there are common resources or project interdependencies at the research or
implementation stage. Interdependencies of this type will not be considered here.research in agriculture has been seen as an important form of international
development aid.
There is a large body of economic analysis to back up this public
investment in scienti¢c research. For comprehensive reviews of this literature
see Norton and Davis (1981) and Alston, Pardey and Norton (1995). The
overwhelming bulk of this literature is devoted to determining how to
evaluate correctly the costs and bene¢ts of research, taking into account
supply shifts, spill-overs, adoption lags and research risks. In response to this
literature, and also in response to ever-greater demands for public account-
ability, project evaluation has become a major preoccupation of many public
research institutions. However, much of the existing literature focuses on
the risk-neutral evaluation of isolated research projects. While this is
important to research managers, it re£ects only one of their problems. They
are concerned with managing their research program as a whole. It will be
argued here, using some fairly simple ideas from the economic theory of
agency, that it is not su¤cient to manage research on a simple project-by-
project basis. Research managers should be risk-averse in their choice of
project, and they should aim for a balanced project portfolio.
The Arrow^Lind theorem (Arrow and Lind 1970) suggests that if projects
are small relative to the size of the economy, and if the returns are
uncorrelated with aggregate income £uctuations, then they should be
evaluated in a risk-neutral manner. Most agricultural research projects
would fall within this classi¢cation, since a great deal of project risk is
research risk, and there seems to be no reason why this would be correlated
with income. If this argument is accepted, then project evaluators should
take risk into account only to the extent of calculating the expected value of
potential projects. There should be no bias either towards risky or towards
safer projects, and there should be no attempt to construct a `balanced'
portfolio of projects. Good projects should be fully funded up to the point of
diminishing marginal expected returns, even if they take up most of the
research budget.
In practice, public research portfolios do not display either the con-
centration of e¡ort or the focus on high-value projects that one might expect
to see if one accepts the Arrow^Lind argument. There may be several
reasons for this. Research organisations often serve an interest group base,
which is diversi¢ed by region and industry. One explanation for portfolio
diversity is the need to have `something to show' to each segment of this
diverse interest base. Another reason is risk avoidance by research managers.
In part this may be due to managerial risk aversion. It may also be due to
the judgment that it is not appropriate, from an organisational point of view,
to invest in excessively risky research or to put all of one's eggs in one
basket.
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Jacobsen (1992) and Scobie, Jacobsen and Frances (1992) of the research
portfolio funded by the Australian wool industry. These authors believe that
there is a strong parallel between investment in research and other forms of
investment. They draw on the analogy with ¢nancial investment, arguing
that risk is relevant and that the same risk management principles should
apply. In particular, they pick up from ¢nance the standard tools of mean-
variance analysis from the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). An
immediate implication of this approach is that risk must be evaluated and
managed on a portfolio-wide basis. Project-by-project evaluation is no longer
good enough. It is worthwhile to be clear why this analogy with the CAPM
is not appropriate for evaluating research portfolios. At ¢rst sight there are
important similarities between ¢nancial investment and investing in scienti¢c
research. In both cases a risky decision must be made which a¡ects risk-
averse individuals. In both cases there is an agency relationship, where the
main stake holder (the principal) stands at arm's length from the investment.
There is, however, an important di¡erence. In standard ¢nance theory the
principal (the investor) is risk-averse, while the agent (the stock broker or
portfolio manager) is risk-neutral.
2 In scienti¢c investment, the opposite is
true and the agency problem is turned on its head. The principal is the
corporate research manager, standing in place of the ¢rms in the client
industry, while the agent is the research scientist.
3 According to the Arrow^
Lind theorem, the principal is risk-neutral. The agent, managing a single
project or a small group of projects, is risk-averse. Thus the agency problem
is quite di¡erent in the two cases, and one cannot rely without further
argument on the analogy with ¢nance.
So why do research managers avoid risk and diversify their portfolios? It
may be that they do not understand the force of the Arrow^Lind argument,
and they would change their practice if it were explained to them. It seems
more likely, however, that risk avoidance in project selection is a rational
and perhaps socially bene¢cial reaction to the agency problem that they face.
It will be argued here that this is indeed so, and that proper consideration
of the agency relationship will lead to a portfolio management problem
which is somewhat di¡erent from that of standard ¢nance theory.
2The principal-agent problem is in this case degenerate, and it is usually suppressed from
the analysis. Recent work in ¢nance focuses more on this agency relationship.
3One can of course consider a hierarchical chain of risk averse managers. For clarity it
will be assumed throughout this article that head o¤ce is run by a sophisticated public
policy analyst, who understands the Arrow^Lind theorem and has the objective of maxi-
mising expected bene¢ts.
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It is hard to monitor what scientists actually do, especially if they are located
in ¢eld stations or laboratories that are physically and culturally distant from
head o¤ce, and if the work that they do is inscrutable to managers. It is
di¤cult to know whether they are working hard, whether they are following
their own scienti¢c interests rather than pursuing corporate priorities,
whether they are directing their e¡orts into projects with positive economic
bene¢ts, and whether they are facilitating the practical application of their
ideas.
In the language of agency theory, there is a `hidden action' or `moral
hazard' problem. This problem can be managed by monitoring and
supervision, and by the creation of appropriate incentive structures, but this
is only an imperfect remedy. A strong incentive structure may do an excellent
job of aligning the scientist's values with those of the organization, but the
role of incentives is constrained by the risk that they impose on the agent.
4
Research is a risky activity, and individual scientists have only a limited
capacity to absorb these risks. Risk aversion thus puts a limit on the extent
to which the organisation can in£uence and control the work that scientists
do.
There is also a `hidden knowledge' or `adverse selection' problem.
Scientists have private knowledge about their abilities, about the probability
of success of their proposals, and about the actual progress that has been
made in their ongoing but incomplete projects. For natural reasons, they
may not be totally frank in revealing this information to head o¤ce project
evaluators and managers. Even if they wish to do so, it may be di¤cult to
communicate this information credibly. A scientist may truly know that a
proposal has a very high expected return, but if everybody exaggerates the
merits of their proposals then it may be di¤cult to get this accurate piece of
information through to management. People who manage or evaluate re-
search confront problems of this type continually. This article will focus on
the `hidden action' problem and its connection with project risk; `hidden
knowledge' problems will at this stage be left to one side.
The projects that are the hardest to monitor are precisely those high-risk,
high-return projects that, if they were measured by the yardstick of standard
cost-bene¢t analysis, may be the most socially valuable. The reason why
risky projects are hard to monitor is straightforward. If a project has only a
10 per cent chance of success, then failure of the project provides almost no
information to the monitor. It is after all what is to be expected. In this
4Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991, 1994) point out that in the presence of measurement
bias a strong incentive scheme may have perverse e¡ects on values.
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successful researchers with promotions or research grants) because the good
researchers are unlikely to di¡erentiate themselves from the bad in a
reasonable time. On the other hand, if the success probability is 90 per cent,
then a failure is quite informative. For these reasons, one might expect to
see a bias towards safer projects. Another way of looking at this problem is
that if agents are risk-averse (which is certainly true of the agents in this
problem), then any attempt to manage by incentives will impose high costs
on risk-averse agents who take on risky projects.
The implication is that, if project risk is ignored, then the project portfolio
may not be managed in an optimal way. This idea is explored formally in
section 3 of the article, where the main ideas are developed in the context of a
single project. In this section the main instruments available to the manager
are the type of project that is undertaken, and complementary investments in
scienti¢c infrastructure that may a¡ect the probability of success and the risk
of failure in the project. In section 4 a project portfolio is studied. The intro-
duction of several projects introduces a new management instrument, namely
project diversi¢cation, which is addressed in this section. The analysis here
is focused on a two-project portfolio, which is su¤cient to explore the
relevant issues (an extension to many projects, which requires new mathe-
matical techniques, is discussed in Bardsley (1997)). Policy implications are
discussed in section 5.
3. Managing a single project
Consider ¢rst the situation where the risk-neutral research manager (the
principal), asks the scientist (the agent) to work on a single project. This
can be modelled as a standard principal-agent model (Holmstrom 1979;
Grossman and Hart 1983).
The project may succeed, with probability p, yielding a bene¢t b to the
principal, or it may fail resulting in a bene¢t of zero. The agent chooses the
probability p, which requires e¡ort ep. The agent is risk averse, with a
utility function that is separable in money and e¡ort. If the project succeeds
then the principal pays the agent X  xU, yielding monetary utility U. If it
fails, then the principal pays the agent x  xu, yielding monetary utility u.
The agent will participate provided that the expected utility is non-negative.
It will be assumed that the agent is risk averse (hence x
0v > 0, x
00v > 0)
and that e
00  0, e
0p  0, e
00p > 0, and e
0p ! 1 as p ! 1. In broad
terms these assumptions about the e¡ort function mean that the agent can
increase the probability of success by working harder, but that no matter
how hard he or she works, success will never be certain.
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pU  1 ÿ pu  ep 1
U ÿ u  e
0p 2
The principal's objective is to maximise
pb ÿ xU ÿ 1 ÿ pxu
subject to these constraints. The agent's problem is convex provided that
e
00p > 0, and the ¢rst-order approach is su¤cient to solve the agency
problem. The Lagrangean is
L  pb ÿ xU ÿ 1 ÿ pxu  lpU  1 ÿ pu ÿ ep  mU ÿ u ÿ e
0p:
This leads to the following ¢rst order conditions in addition to equations 1
and 2.
x









b  xU ÿ xu  me
00p 5
After a slight rearrangement this gives
ep  u  pe
0p 6
l  px
0U  1 ÿ px
0u 7
It can be shown (see Appendix) that m > 0, l > 0, and 0 < p < 1.
In contrast, if the principal can observe and control the agent's e¡ort then
the incentive compatibility constraint does not bind; the Lagrangean is
L
0  p
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Figure 1 shows the e¡ort function ep, the reward structure u;U, and the
probability of success p. The chord between u and U is tangent to the e¡ort
function; this geometrical fact summarises the agent's participation and
incentive compatibility constraints. In this ¢gure there is also shown the
contract u
0;U
0, and the success probability p
0 that would be chosen if e¡ort
were observable and there were no agency problem. It can be shown (see
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Figure 2 E¡ort and marginal reward
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0 > p; the optimal e¡ort is less, as is the probability of
success, when e¡ort cannot be monitored.
Figure 2 shows the relationship (equations 6 and 7) between the optimal
e¡ort ep and the Lagrange multiplier l. The Lagrange multiplier is an
indication of how strongly the agent's participation constraint binds. If l is
large, then the agent's willingness to participate is an important constraint
on the principal's ability to meet his objective. It can be seen that l may be
either greater or smaller than l
0.
3.1 Management implications
Now consider the choice of project. To do this, assume that the e¡ort
required to achieve a success rate p depends on the choice of project. Thus
the e¡ort function ep should be replaced in the model above by ep;b. It
will be assumed that ebp;b > 0 and epbp;b > 0. More valuable projects
require greater e¡ort both in total and at the margin. The optimal value of b
can be found by applying the envelope theorem to the Lagrangean:
p  lebp;b  mepbp;b: 8
The left-hand side of this equation represents the marginal expected bene¢t
from moving to a more valuable project. The ¢rst term on the right
represents the marginal increase in the cost of the project, assuming that
there is no change in the agent's behaviour. This is precisely the calculation
that would be made in a standard cost-bene¢t analysis, such as might be
undertaken by a head o¤ce team of project evaluators, using standard
techniques and ignoring the agency problem (the Lagrange multiplier l
converts marginal utility to marginal cost). The third term represents the
e¡ect on the agent's incentives. The change in the project increases the
marginal e¡ort required to achieve the success rate p. This deterioration in
the agent's incentive must be corrected by a steeper reward schedule; since
the agent is risk averse this increases the expected cost to the principal. This
is the third term of the equation. Since m is positive, so is this last term. This
leads to the ¢rst conclusion from this analysis. A standard cost-bene¢t
analysis, which ignores the agency problem, will choose a project that is too
risky.
One can also consider the value of investing in complementary capital
items or other expenses: scienti¢c equipment, libraries, conference expenses,
and so on. Let x be the complementary expenditure. The e¡ort function ep
should be now be replaced by ep;x. It will be assumed that exp;x > 0
and epxp;x > 0. The ancillary investment raises both total and marginal
productivity. Of course x must also be subtracted from the Lagrangean as an
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complementary investment is given by
1  lexp;x  mepxp;x: 9
The conclusion is as before. A standard cost-bene¢t analysis considers only
the direct reduction in the cost of the research e¡ort, and ignores the e¡ect
on incentives. The complementary resources increase the agent's marginal
productivity, leading to a higher level of e¡ort for a given incentive structure.
Thus the standard analysis will result in an under-investment in related
resources that increase the productivity of scientists.
4. Managing a project portfolio
Now consider the case where there are several projects. Bergemann (1992)
has analysed a general multi-task principal-agent problem that can be
applied in this context. Assume for simplicity that there are two projects and
that the projects are independent. The bene¢ts and the costs are additive,
and the outcomes are statistically independent. Project i may succeed with
probability pi, yielding a bene¢t bi to the principal, or it may fail resulting in
a bene¢t of zero. To achieve this probability of success the agent must exert
an e¡ort costing in utility terms eipi. The principal o¡ers a contract which
yields the agent utility u
11 if both projects succeed, u
10 if only project one
succeeds, u
01 if only project two succeeds, and u
00 if both projects fail. This
requires a monetary transfer of xu
ij, where the reward function xu is the
inverse of the utility function. The contract must satisfy participation
and incentive compatibility constraints. The principal's problem can be
summarised by the Lagrangean
L  p1p2b1  b2 ÿ xu
11  p11 ÿ p2b1 ÿ xu
10
 1 ÿ p1p2b2 ÿ xu
01  1 ÿ p11 ÿ p2ÿxu
00
 lp1p2u
11  p11 ÿ p2u
10  1 ÿ p1p2u
01
 1 ÿ p11 ÿ p2u
00 ÿ e1p1 ÿ e2p2
 m1p2u
11 ÿ u












The key ¢rst-order conditions are
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Just as in the single project case, one can show that l > 0, m1 > 0 and
m2 > 0.
5 The main implications of this model then follow: there will be a bias
towards projects that are too risky, and there will be under-investment in
complementary resources.
What does this mean for research management? The implication is that
the research portfolio should be well diversi¢ed. This is clearly contrary to
the full information policy under which only the project, or group of
projects, promising the maximal expected return would be funded.
Bergemann explains clearly the reasoning for this type of result. The
principal wants to impose sharp incentives on the agent, in order to get a
high level of e¡ort. However, strong incentives impose an unacceptable
degree of risk on the agent. Anything that reduces the agent's exposure to
risk is good for the principal, as it allows a more favourable incentive
structure to be imposed. One way to do this is to allow the agent to hold a
diversi¢ed project portfolio. The striking implication is that diversi¢cation is
required at the branches of the organisation, not at the roots. Each labor-
atory manager or ¢eld station manager should hold a diversi¢ed portfolio,
but there is no reason to hold a diversi¢ed portfolio of laboratories or ¢eld
stations.
5. Conclusion
Public research is undertaken by large, complex and decentralised organisa-
tions. While the managers of these research institutions pay attention to the
cost-bene¢t calculations produced by their project analysts, this is only a
small part of their task. Much of their work is concerned with the manage-
ment of people and of groups of people. This article suggests that this
concern is intrinsic to the nature of the task, and that the proper economic
analysis of research projects should take into account structure and
incentives in the organisations that carry out research. Several aspects of the
5See Bardsley (1997).
332 P. Bardsley
# Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1999agency relationship warrant investigation; this article focuses on the `moral
hazard' or `hidden action' problem.
The main conclusions are as follows. Despite the Arrow^Lind theorem,
risk does matter. Research managers should be risk-averse in choosing
projects. A risk-neutral expected return calculation ignores the e¡ect of risk
on the incentives of scientists and project managers. Not all risk is relevant.
Research managers should be risk-averse with regard to research risk (the
risk that projects might fail), but risk-neutral with regard to market risk or
the risk that discoveries might not be adopted (for these the Arrow^Lind
theorem applies). A risk-neutral expected return calculation will under-
estimate the bene¢t from complementary expenditure (on libraries, scienti¢c
equipment, or travel to conferences) that raises the marginal productivity of
scientists. Such a calculation ignores the bene¢cial e¡ect of complementary
investment on incentives. Research institutions should hold a diversi¢ed
portfolio of projects, but the diversi¢cation should occur at the local or
branch level of the organisation. The reasons for diversi¢cation are quite
di¡erent from those in ¢nancial markets.
In a recent report, the World Bank (1996) highlights some of the policy
issues in agricultural research that are currently facing the world agricultural
system. It recommends extensive adoption of the formal research evaluation
paradigm exempli¢ed by the Alston, Norton and Pardey (1995) monograph.
It recommends, in particular, that expected project return should not be
discounted for risk, and it argues this case on the basis of the Arrow^Lind
proposition. The optimal portfolio of projects is just the portfolio of highest-
ranking projects, each fully funded
6 in descending order of rank until the
budget runs out. One implication of this position is that research portfolios
would be likely to be very concentrated, with the lion's share of the funds
going to one or two favoured projects. Another implication is that, if project
evaluation can be made routine, with common approaches and standardised
software, then funds can be allocated by a decentralised bidding process.
There is no need for any management overview of the portfolio composition.
Australia is a good example of a country where this approach is being
applied more frequently. Funds under the control of industry research
corporations are allocated in precisely this way, and government
departments are adopting a similar purchaser-provider model.
I would argue here to moderate this rather simplistic approach. There is
no doubt that the evaluation driven model of research fund allocation is an
important part of the answer to the search for e¤ciency. But research
6That is, until decreasing returns reduce the value of the project to equal the value of
the next best project.
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program as a whole, and this concern goes beyond merely ¢nding the
projects with the highest expected rate of return. They are also concerned
with evaluating scientists, and providing scientists with incentives to work
well. A diversi¢ed portfolio with a variety of projects, some easy, some hard,
providing a range of milestones and signals of success, makes this easier to
do. When these incentive e¡ects are taken properly into account, as well as
the factors emphasised by Alston, Norton and Pardey, one might expect
to see a slightly di¡erent project portfolio. One might also expect to see
research management institutions that are responsive to, but are not
completely driven by, project evaluation techniques.
Appendix
The basic model is a particular case of the general agency model analysed by
Grossman and Hart (1983), in particular, Section 4 of that paper. Most of the
results used here can be found in some form amongst their results, but is easier to
derive them from scratch. The important results are
l > 0; i
m > 0; ii
0 < p < 1; iii
p < p
0: iv
Consider these in turn. The ¢rst follows immediately from equation 7, since the
marginal payment function is positive.
The second is a version of Holmstrom's Theorem. Assume that m  0; by
equations 3 and 4, and the monotonicity of the reward function, xU  xu. By
equation 5 this implies that b  0, which is a contradiction.
To show (iii), assume that p  0, By equation (3) m  0, so u  U. Then by
equation 5 this implies that b  0, which is a contradiction. Thus p > 0. It is clear
that p < 1 from the assumption that the e¡ort function becomes in¢nitely steep
before p reaches 1.
Now consider (v). For a given p, let up;Up be the contract which induces







 1 ÿ pe
00p. The principal's
problem is to choose p to maximise
V p  pb ÿ pxUp ÿ 1 ÿ pxup:
Without loss of generality, utility can be scaled so that up
0  0 and Up
0  1
(recall that p
0 is the success rate chosen under full information).
Let xv;a  axv  1 ÿ ax0  x
00v  x0  x
00v  ayv. As a varies
between 0 and 1, this perturbs the inverse utility or reward function of the agent; if
a  0 then the agent is risk neutral, while if a  1 we return to the original
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0v  0 and y
00v  0 for 0  v  1 (this is a consequence
of risk aversion). Let pa be the e¡ort that the principal would induce from an
agent of type a; this maximises the objective
V p;a  pb ÿ pxUp;a ÿ 1 ÿ pxup;a:
Notice that p0  p
0 (since a risk-neutral agent will implement the full information
e¡ort p), while p1  p. To show that p < p
0 it is su¤cient to show that p
0v  0
for 0  v  1. By a standard envelope argument, the sign of p
0v is the same as the
sign of the cross-derivative




By (ii) above U > u, so this quantity is negative as required.
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